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“Bankruptcy Code”).5 The court in Pioneer determined that because Congress provided no 
guideposts for evaluating whether neglect is excusable, the analysis should be an equitable one 
that focused on the danger of prejudice to the debtor.6 Thus, the court created a four-factor 
balancing test to determine when prejudice to the debtor makes an attorney’s neglect 
inexcusable. 
The Pioneer factors present a high burden to overcome.  Indeed, there are very few cases 
in which a court allowed a creditor to file a late claim. This memorandum explores under what 
circumstances the court will allow a late file claim. Part I discusses the Pioneer case and 
analyzes the Supreme Court’s adoption and application of the four “Pioneer factors.” Part II 
examines a recent case in which a court applied the Pioneer factors, found excusable neglect, 
and allowed a creditor to file a late proof of claim. Part III addresses the Southern District of 
New York’s elaboration of each of the factors in In re Lyondell, in which the court gives a 
thorough analysis of each fact and its respective applicability.  
I.  The Pioneer Factors 
 In Pioneer, certain creditors filed their proofs of claim after the deadline (i.e., the bar 
date)  for the filing of proofs of claim.  In connection with the late claim filings, the creditors 
also filed a motion requesting permission for the late filings under Rule 9006(b)(1). In an attempt 
to qualify the late filing as excusable neglect, creditor’s counsel explained that he had recently 
left his former law firm and had been in a state of disruption and upheaval.7  The Bankruptcy 
Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, following precedent from the Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit, held that a party may claim excusable neglect only if its “failure to timely 
                                                
5 See id. at 389; see also US v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983). 
6 Pioneer, 507 U.S. 380, 395. 
7 Id.  
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perform a duty was due to circumstances which were beyond its reasonable control.”8 Because 
the court found that the creditors had received notice of the bar date and could have reasonably 
complied, it denied the creditors’ motion and refused the late filing. 
  On appeal, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee found 
“respectable authority” for the narrow reading of excusable neglect by the Bankruptcy Court, but 
concluded that the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which is where the Bankruptcy Court 
is located, would follow a more liberal approach. The District Court borrowed the relatively 
liberal test announced by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that evaluates several factors 
in respondent’s conduct including: (1) whether granting the delay will prejudice the debtor; (2) 
the length of delay; (3) whether the delay was beyond the reasonable control of the person whose 
duty it was to perform; (4) whether the creditor acted in good faith; and (5) whether clients 
should be penalized for their counsel’s mistake or neglect.9 The District Court also stated that, on 
remand, the Bankruptcy Court should consider whether the failure to file the claims by the bar 
date resulted from negligence, indifference, or culpable conduct on the part of the moving 
creditor.10  
 On remand, the Bankruptcy Court again denied respondent’s motion and the District 
Court affirmed the ruling. However, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed after 
concluding that excusable neglect is not limited to cases where the failure to timely act is due to 
circumstances beyond the movant’s control.11  
                                                
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id at 385. 
11 Id. 
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On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed that a flexible interpretation of excusable neglect 
coincides with the policies underlying Chapter 11 and the bankruptcy rules.12 According to the 
Court, the history of Rule 9006(b)(1) supports the conclusion that the extension of the time 
periods under the excusable neglect standard is not limited to circumstances beyond the party’s 
control. To determine whether neglect should be considered “excusable,” the Court identified the 
following four factors that considered all relevant circumstances surrounding the party’s 
omission:  
(1) Danger of prejudice to the debtor;  
(2) The length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings;  
(3) The reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of 
the movant; and  
(4) Whether the movant acted in good faith.13  
The Court, however, rejected the Sixth Circuit’s suggestion that it would be inappropriate 
to penalize respondents for the omissions of their attorney.  According to the Court, the Court of 
Appeals should have considered whether the attorney, as the respondent’s agent, did all he 
reasonably could to comply with the court-ordered bar, rather than whether the respondents did 
all they reasonably could in policing the conduct of their attorney.14  
Despite finding that the Sixth Circuit erred in this part of its analysis, the Supreme Court 
concluded that the result was still correct. The Court concluded that there was no evidence of 
prejudice to the petitioner and there was no indication of bad faith, and that the unusual form of 
                                                
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 395. 
14 Id. at 396. 
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notice used in this case confirmed that the neglect of the respondent’s counsel was, considering 
all the circumstances, excusable.15  
II.  Pioneer Factors Applied in In re LMM Sports Management 
In June 2016, the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit 
commented on excusable neglect and its potentially prejudicial effects. In In re LMM Sports 
Management, appellant Warner Angle Hallam Jackson & Formancek, P.L.C. (“Warner Angle”) 
filed proofs of claim against the debtor, LMM Sports Management (“LMM”) for legal services it 
provided to LMM in connection with a prior state court case against Your Source Pacific Fund I, 
LLP (“Your Source”).16 In the state court case, Your Source obtained a $2.4 million judgment 
against LMM, causing LMM to file for protection under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The 
bankruptcy court approved a settlement of $1.5 million between Your Source and LMM 
(represented by new counsel) in full satisfaction of Your Source’s judgment over Warner 
Angle’s objection. Warner Angle filed its objection to the Debtor’s settlement motion on 
February 17, 2015, two months after the bar date. One day later, Warner Angle belatedly filed 
the proofs of claim. The Debtor objected to the proofs of claim arguing they should be 
disallowed as untimely. Warner Angle then filed a cross-motion requesting that the proofs be 
treated as timely because the late filing was the result of excusable neglect. The bankruptcy court 
rejected Warner Angle’s excusable neglect argument and denied its reconsideration motion. 
Warner Angle appealed. 
        The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit noted that requests to file a late proof 
of claim based on excusable neglect should be analyzed by considering the totality of the 
                                                
15 Id. at 399. 
16 In re LMM Sports Mgmt., BAP No. AZ-15-1195, 2016 WL 3213829, at *1-3 (9th Cir. June 1, 
2016). 
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circumstances and by focusing on the four specific factors established in Pioneer. (1) the danger 
of prejudice to the non-moving party; (2) the length of delay and its potential impact on judicial 
proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control 
of the movant; and (4) whether the moving party’s conduct was in good faith.17  
The lower bankruptcy court found that Warner Angle had satisfied two of the four 
Pioneer factors; Warner Angle (1) acted in good faith, and (2) established that the length of 
delay was relatively minor and did not influence the debtor’s bankruptcy cases.18 Warner Angle 
conceded that there was not a good reason for the delay and that avoiding the delay would have 
been within Warner Angle’s reasonable control.19 On appeal, Warner Angle focused on the 
“danger of prejudice” element. The lower court found that if Warner Angle had timely filed its 
proofs of claim, LMM would have had the option to consider a different path than the one they 
chose, which involved finalizing and submitting their settlement agreement for approval with 
Your Source.20 Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel concluded that LMM would be 
prejudiced by allowing Warner Angle to file a late claim.  
III.  The Pioneer Factors Elaborated Upon in In re Lyondell Chemical Co. 
 The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York found that excusable 
neglect should be elastic in its application and should be fact specific rather than held to a rigid 
standard.21  In In re Lyondell, a trustee did not request an extension of time to move to substitute 
a new executor to the deceased defendant’s estate within the 90-day period specified by the 
                                                
17 See Pioneer, 507 U.S. 380, 395. 
18 In re LMM Sports Mgmt, 2016 WL 3213829, at *2. 
19 Id. 
20 See id. at *4. 
21 In re Lyondell Chemical Co., 543. B.R. 400, 407 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016); see also 4B Wright 
& Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d § 1165 at 533–34 (3d ed.2002). 
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court.22 The court applied the Pioneer factors, and elaborated on the proper weight each factor 
should be given.  
 The court opined that the first Pioneer factor, danger of prejudice to the non-moving 
party, is more complex than a “simple dollar-for-dollar depletion of assets otherwise available 
for timely filed claims.23 Courts apply more than this simple analysis by delving into any adverse 
impacts a claim might have on the judicial administration of the case.24  
 With regard to the second factor, the length of delay and its potential impact on judicial 
proceedings, the Bankruptcy Court considered the Second Circuit’s opinion in In re Enron 
Corp.,25 that the length of delay in time is only given meaning by its effect on the administration 
of the case and that there has been no court which established a bright-line rule to determine 
when the lateness of a claim would be considered substantial.26  
 The Bankruptcy Court emphasized the third factor -- reason for delay -- noting that it is 
the “predominant factor” and should be given the most weight.27 The fourth factor, good faith, is 
rarely at issue.28 Though there is no formal presumption of good faith, courts have stated that a 
record lacking bad faith provides appropriate grounds for a finding of good faith.  
The Lyondell court focused primarily on the third factor. According to the court, the 
evidence demonstrated that the trustee, for reasons beyond his control, could not substitute the 
executor of the defendant on the proof of claim.  Consequently, the court found the trustee’s 
neglect excusable. The court stated that where an unusual form of notice provides an “adequate 
                                                
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 410; see also In re R.H. Macy, 166 B.R.799, 802 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.1994). 
24 Id. 
25  419 F. 3d 115 (2d Cir. 2005). 
26 Id. at 410; see also In re Enron Corp., 419 F. 3d 115. 
27 Id. at 409. 
28 Id. at 410. 
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reason” for the delay and where there is no indication of any “intentional effort to withhold 
information from the claimant,” the negligence should be found excusable.29  
Conclusion  
When determining whether to allow a late filing, a court will consider all four of the 
Pioneer factors in determining if excusable neglect exists.  Courts, however, will likely focus 
principally on reason for the delay. As illustrated in the cases discussed herein, determining 
whether late filings of proofs of claim will be considered excusable is extremely fact-specific and 
depends heavily upon circumstances and whether those circumstances were within the movant's 
reasonable control.  
 
                                                
29 Id. at 413. 
